Willingness-to-Pay for Organic Food Products and Organic Purity: Experimental Evidence by Strzok, Jesse Lance
Graduate Theses and Dissertations Iowa State University Capstones, Theses andDissertations
2012
Willingness-to-Pay for Organic Food Products and
Organic Purity: Experimental Evidence
Jesse Lance Strzok
Iowa State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd
Part of the Labor Economics Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University Digital
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital
Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Strzok, Jesse Lance, "Willingness-to-Pay for Organic Food Products and Organic Purity: Experimental Evidence" (2012). Graduate
Theses and Dissertations. 12850.
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/etd/12850
Willingness-to-pay for organic food products and organic purity:
Experimental evidence
by
Jesse Lance Strzok
A thesis submitted to the graduate faculty
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE
Major: Economics
Program of Study Committee:
Wallace E. Hu↵man, Major Professor
Tanya S. Rosenblat
Helen H. Jensen
Iowa State University
Ames, Iowa
2012
Copyright c  Jesse Lance Strzok, 2012. All rights reserved.
ii
DEDICATION
I would like to dedicate this thesis to my mother and father; their sacrifices and kindness
guide me to this day.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
CHAPTER 2. RECRUITMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
CHAPTER 3. EXPERIMENTAL METHOD AND DESIGN . . . . . . . . . . 5
CHAPTER 4. DATA AND RESULTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.1 Data Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.1.1 Equality of Means . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.2 Regression Analysis of Bid Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.2.1 Empirical Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.2.2 Equality of Means of Di↵erences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
APPENDIX A. TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
APPENDIX B. FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
APPENDIX C. ADDITIONAL MATERIAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
iv
LIST OF TABLES
A.1 Characteristics of Participants (N=154) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
A.2 Treatment One Bids . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
A.3 Equality of Means for Conventional and Organic Co↵ee (Treatment One) 18
A.4 Equality of Means for Conventional and Organic Maple Syrup (Treat-
ment One) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
A.5 Equality of Means for Conventional and Organic Olive Oil (Treatment
One) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
A.6 Equality of Means Across Purity Levels (Treatment Two) . . . . . . . 21
A.7 Regression Analysis: Variable Names and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . 22
A.8 OLS General Model of Price Di↵erences: Organic less Conventional . . 23
A.9 OLS General Model Joint Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
A.10 OLS Refined Model of Price Di↵erences: Organic less Conventional . . 24
A.11 Bid Ranges in USD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
vLIST OF FIGURES
B.1 Di↵erence in WTP as a Function of Income Per Person . . . . . . . . . 26
vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to take this opportunity to thank my professors and committee members who
helped me with various aspects of my research and this thesis. Dr. Wallace E. Hu↵man for
his guidance, hard work, and support throughout this research and writing. Dr. Tanya S.
Rosenblat and Dr. Helen H. Jensen, for their help in the design of the experiment, suggestions,
and motivation. Additionally, I thank the Seed Science Department for providing assistantship
support and resources to carry out the lab experiments, and the Nutrition and Wellness Re-
search Center for use of their facilities. I would also like to thank my friends and family for
their love and assistance.
vii
ABSTRACT
The market for organic products has been growing rapidly over the past decade, and is
now available not only in specialty stores like Whole Foods but also in Hy-Vee and other
large grocery stores and super markets. Even Wal-Mart and Target carry organic produce and
dairy products. This paper uses information collected in laboratory experiments to test the
hypothesis that some consumers are willing-to-pay more for organic than conventional food and
that they will pay more for organic food with higher degrees of organic purity. The participants
in the experiments are from the Ames, Iowa area. The experimental products are organic and
conventional co↵ee, maple syrup and olive oil. We found that participants were willing to
pay higher prices for an organic product with high levels of organic purity. Also, individuals
with more education were willing to pay more for organic relative to conventional products, and
additional household income (per capita basis) increased willingness-to-pay for organic products
up to $85,400, and willingness-to-pay decreased as per capita household income increased above
$85,400.
1CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
The market for organic food in the United States has steadily grown over the past two
decades. These products must carry a label to di↵erentiate them from conventional prod-
ucts. Various organic groups, e.g., California Certified Organic Farmers, and a few states, e.g.,
California and Texas, developed organic standards first. However, as organic standards prolif-
erated, some organic producers and consumers raised concern and lobbied for a recognizable
national standard. Small organic producers, however, did not want an expensive organic cer-
tification/inspection system. The 1990 farm bill included the Organic Foods Production Act.
The Act asked the Secretary of Agriculture to establish a national list of allowed synthetic sub-
stances that may be used, and a list of prohibited substances that could not be used in organic
production and handling operations. The USDA’s Agricultural Marketing Service developed
these standards, which are known as the National Organic Program (NOP) and they first went
into e↵ect in October, 2002.1
Production standards for organic are “process based,” i.e., the national organic standards
address the “production process” or the methods, practices, and substances used in producing
and handling crops, livestock, and processed agricultural products. The requirements apply to
the way that products are created, not to measurable properties of the resulting product itself.
Although specific practices and materials used by organic operations may vary, the standards
require every aspect of organic production and handling to comply with the provisions of
the Organic Foods Production Act (USDA: AMS, 2000), including the list of approved and
prohibited practices, methods and substances (USDA: AMS, 2011). Also, annual audits of
records are required of USDA certified organic food.
Under the NOP, di↵erent purity levels exist, and those products with the highest degree of
1See Hu↵man and Strzok for more information.
2purity may carry the USDA’s “Organic Seal.” Products consisting of all ingredients that are
organically sourced can be labeled as “100 percent organic” and carry the USDA seal. Products
that are sourced with at least 95% organic ingredients may be labeled as “organic,” and they
may also carry the USDA’s organic seal. Those products which contain at least 70% organically
produced ingredients may be labeled as “made with organic ingredients” but cannot display the
USDA’s organic seal. Any product with less than 70% organically sourced ingredients cannot
display “organic” except upon the ingredients statement, and the USDA seal may not be used.
In contrast in the EU, only products which are 95% or greater organically sourced may be
labeled as “organic.” 2
The production of organic food raises the cost of production relative to conventional prod-
ucts, and the production of organic products with higher percentages of organic ingredients
also raise the cost of production. Hence, a key issue is whether consumers are willing to pay
more for these products. There exist a number of studies which show that consumers exhibit a
greater willingness-to-pay (WTP) for organic products over conventional products with iden-
tical appearance. For example, in a study of organic versus conventional apples with identical
appearance, Yue, Alfes and Jensen (2009) show 75% of participants were willing to pay more
for the organic apples. However, to the best of our knowledge we know of no literature dealing
with specific levels of organic purity of food products and at the impact of socio-economic
factors.
This paper uses information collected in laboratory experiments to test the hypothesis that
consumers are willing to pay more for organic than conventional food, and that they will pay
more for organic food with higher degrees of organic purity. The participants in the experiments
are from the Ames, Iowa area, and are perhaps best described as employees of Iowa State
University (ISU). Approximately 85% of the participants are employed by or are students of
2On February 15, 2012 (e↵ective June 1, 2012), the “U.S. - European Union Organic Equivalence Arrange-
ment” was made, which means the EU and the United States will recognize each other’s organic production rules
and control systems as equivalent for three years. In this particular case the EU will label “100 percent organic”
and “organic” products from the United States simply as “organic.” For products “made with organic ingredi-
ents” from the United States, the EU will reference the organic ingredients on the ingredients statement. Several
additional requirements must be met by producers which can be found by visiting the European Commission’s
website - ec.europa.eu or the USDA’s website - usda.gov.
3ISU. The experimental products are organic and conventional co↵ee, maple syrup and olive oil.3
We design a random nth-price auction to elicit values from participants. Although Vickrey’s
(1961) second-price auction is demand revealing in theory and has an endogenous market-
clearing price, o↵-margin bidders can bid insincerely with few consequences if these bids fall
below the market-clearing price, see Shogren et al. (2001). For this reason, a random nth-price
auction, which can also induce sincere bidding in theory, is used instead of second-price (or
some other known nth-price) auction for better empirical results. This paper unfolds in the
following chapters.
3The goods were chosen as they are considered credence goods in the experiment (goods were not consumed
in the experiment) as-well-as in use for many consumers.
4CHAPTER 2. RECRUITMENT
To obtain subjects for our experiments, we reduced the cost by advertising in the Ames
area. We advertised the opportunity to participate in a short experiment in economic decision
making with food, during July 2012, with the experiment already approved by ISU’s O ce
for Responsible Research Institutional Review Board.1 Interested parties were informed that
participants were required to be between 18 and 65 years of age and all would be paid $20
for participation. The dates and times of proposed experiment sessions were also included.
Interested parties contacted us either by email or phone to sign up for a session time.
Our goal was to have frequent purchasers of groceries participate in a study which focuses
on the buying habits of the representative consumer. Hence, we excluded people under the age
of 18 and people over the age of 65. We believe that people under 18 are more likely to live with
their parents, not be the main purchaser of groceries, or are less involved in food preparation
and planning. Similarly, we excluded people aged 65 and over as they are more likely to have
di↵erent purchasing habits, unique dietary concerns, and may have their meals provided for
them than the representative consumer.
We requested each potential participant to tell us three di↵erent session times which would
work for them. This gave us some flexibility to combine individuals into groups of 12–20 per
session. Once participants were assigned to a session, we notified them of their session date
and time. We also sent an additional reminder notification approximately 24 hours before
their session with directions and the time of their session. We obtained 154 volunteers for our
experiments.
1ISU IRB ID 12–260
5CHAPTER 3. EXPERIMENTAL METHOD AND DESIGN
At the experiment location all participants were first asked to sign a consent form. Then
they were given an ID number to insure anonymity, an instructions and bid packet (hereafter
packet), and then told to enter the lab. Once in the lab, they were told to complete a short
questionnaire (asking socio-economic questions, knowledge about organic foods, and whether
they read food labels). To reduce concerns about a cash constraint, the participants were paid
$20 as promised and signed a receipt. This occurred before any instructions about the auctions
were read.
Sessions were run one at a time by one monitor and one assistant. The packet participants
received included information on the experimental products that were to be bid on, an expla-
nation of a random nth-price auction, a quiz on the auction format, and the bid instructions for
each round. In addition to the packet, the session monitor also reviewed all of the information
with the participants.
Participants were then informed by the session monitor that they would be bidding on
three experimental commodities, that only one of several rounds of biding would be binding,
and asked that all bids submitted be non-negative in value. They were also informed that
there would be a practice round using candy bars, but this would not be binding. At this
point they were also informed that winning experimental products may come in a di↵erent
container than those shown in the lab experiments. Participants were also asked to refrain
from communicating with other participants, and that any questions should be directed to the
monitor.
The (private value) random nth-price auction was chosen because of its superior performance
in auctions of relatively new products. Participants were told that in a random nth-price
auction, each participant places a bid on all auctioned products. Bids are collected, ranked
6from highest-to-lowest, and assigned a number representing their rank (i.e. the highest bid is 1
and the 4th highest bid is 4). A number is then randomly generated from a uniform distribution
between 2 and k, where k is the number of participants in the auction. This number n is then
the price of the winning bid (the nth-price) and any participant who bids higher wins the
auction. Hence, this auction is di↵erent from many auctions in that all participants place bids,
and there are likely multiple winners. Participants were also told that their best strategy (a
weakly dominant strategy) was to bid sincerely (common practice in such auctions). In all
of the rounds of bidding, including the practice round, participants were told that they could
examine the products before placing bids.
Next, participants were given a hypothetical example, which was followed by a short quiz
to test their understanding of the random nth-price auction. The monitor went over the correct
answers and provided explanations when questions were raised. The practice round and an
auction of candy bars followed. Participants came to the front to examine the candy on a table
at the front of the lab. After the monitor collected all bids, they were rank-ordered, the random
nth-price was chosen and winning bids and bidders were identified. Any remaining questions
were addressed.
Next, the auction turned to the three experimental products - co↵ee, maple syrup, and
olive oil. The co↵ee was 14 pound whole bean Arabica French roast, the maple syrup was 250
milliliters US Grade A dark amber, and the olive oil was 250 milliliters cold-pressed extra virgin.
These are widely purchased commodities by U.S. households and are available in the market as
USDA “100 percent organic” ingredients. The latter attribute permitted us to accurately label
our organic lab products as having at least 95%, 97%, or 99% organic ingredients. Conventional
versions of these products were also readily available in local grocery stores.
Experimental products were properly grouped and placed under bins on a table at the front
of the lab. Across sessions, the ordering of the groups of products was randomized to minimize
sequencing e↵ects. Participants were then asked one-by-one to the front of the room to view
and examine the products. Then, they were to return to their seat and write down bid prices
on the bid sheets provided in their packet. When this was complete, the participants laid
the bid sheet face down and the assistant picked them up. After all bids were collected in a
7session (three rounds of bidding), they were ranked-ordered by commodity with participants
ID numbers displayed. The random n was generated and winners were identified.
The auction of experimental commodities consisted of two “treatments.” The first treat-
ment included an organic product and a conventional product of the same type, e.g., co↵ee.
Organic products might contain at least 95%, 97%, or 99% organic ingredients. Under the
second treatment, participants were asked to bid on a product di↵ering in the purity of organic
ingredients, e.g., co↵ee with at least 95%, 97%, or 99% organic ingredients. We ran eight
sessions under the first treatment, and two sessions under the second treatment. Participants
were randomly assigned among sessions. Under the first treatment, we show an example of
how the rounds of bidding in a session might look as presented:
Round 1- Olive Oil: Two products shown, one labeled “conventional” and one “organic,” with
additional information in the packet stating the “olive oil labeled as organic is at least 97%
organic.”
Round 2 - Maple Syrup: Two products shown, one labeled “conventional” and one “organic”
with additional information in the packet stating the “maple syrup labeled as organic is at least
95% organic.”
Round 3 - Co↵ee: Two products shown, one labeled “conventional” and one “organic,” with
additional information in the packet stating the “co↵ee labeled as organic is at least 99%
organic.”
Under the second treatment, an example of how the rounds of bidding in a session might
look as presented:
Round 1- Olive Oil: Three levels of organic purity and products with the following labels shown,
“at least 95% organic,” “at least 97% organic,” and “at least 99% organic.”
Round 2 - Maple Syrup: Three levels of organic purity and products with the following labels
shown, “at least 95% organic,” “at least 97% organic,” and “at least 99% organic.”
Round 3 - Co↵ee: Three levels of organic purity and products with the following labels shown,
“at least 95% organic,” “at least 97% organic,” and “at least 99% organic.”
By presenting the participants with three di↵erent levels of purity of co↵ee, maple syrup,
or olive oil, we anticipated we could exaggerate the di↵erences in WTP for small di↵erences in
8organic purity levels. Why run such a treatment? This is similar to how the products are often
presented at grocery stores; partially organic, organic, and 100% organic items are frequently
side-by-side.
9CHAPTER 4. DATA AND RESULTS
We ran ten sessions at the Nutrition and Wellness Research Center at ISU Research Park in
Ames, Iowa during July 2012. Eight sessions (129 participants, although one participant’s data
was missing) were run with the first treatment, and two sessions (25 participants) of the second
treatment were run. Sessions ranged in size from 11 to 21 participants. Please see Table A.1
for characteristics and additional data summaries of participants, and Table A.2 for numbers
of participants for each product and purity level.
4.1 Data Analysis
In the following sections we will present the analysis of the data collected from the two
treatments. For both treatments we test for equality of mean bid prices. Next, we conduct
a regression analysis of bid price data from individual observations on prices of organic and
conventional food products, and run equality of means tests of the di↵erences.
4.1.1 Equality of Means
4.1.1.1 Treatment One
We tested equality of means for each good between conventional and a certain percentage
of organic, and between di↵erent percentages of organic. Due to the design of the experiment
we have WTP bids for the conventional products for each participant, but only approximately
one-third as many WTP bids for each organic good of a certain percentage of purity. We ran
t-tests between the means of the organic bids and conventional bids, looking for significant
di↵erences as-well-as between the means of the organic goods (di↵erent percentages). These
are run with all bids, and again with bids of zero omitted. Our hypothesis of equal means was
10
rejected in most cases; often, consumers have a greater WTP for higher organic purity. In cases
of interest, when it is not rejected, it is discussed. We use a conventional confidence level of
10%; we present confidence levels if they were equal to 10% or greater.
Co↵ee For co↵ee, mean bids for an organic product are significantly larger than the
mean for the conventional product. The mean bid for organic co↵ee with at least 97% organic
ingredients has the highest bids. We fail to reject the null hypothesis that the mean bid of
organic co↵ee of at least 95% organic ingredients is equal to the mean price of organic co↵ee
with at least 99% organic ingredients. However, we reject the null hypothesis that the mean
price of co↵ee with at least 97% organic ingredients is equal to the mean of co↵ee with at least
99% organic ingredients, forcing us to fail to reject the alternative hypothesis that co↵ee with
at least 97% organic ingredients is greater than co↵ee with at least 99% organic ingredients.
When omitting bids of zero, we faced many more cases where we failed to reject the null
hypothesis of equal mean bid prices. We failed to reject the hypothesis that the mean price
of co↵ee with at least 95% organic ingredients is equal to the conventional mean prices, and
co↵ee with at least 99% organic ingredients. We also failed to reject the hypothesis that the
mean price of co↵ee with at least 99% organic ingredients is equal to the conventional mean
prices of co↵ee. Again, we failed to reject the alternative hypothesis that co↵ee with at least
97% organic ingredients is greater than co↵ee with at least 99% organic ingredients. For more
equality of means analysis for co↵ee please see Table A.3.
Maple Syrup For syrup, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of equal mean bid
prices for syrup with at least 95% organic ingredients and the mean prices of conventional
syrup; similarly for syrup with at least 97% organic ingredients. After eliminating zero bids
for syrup, we see the same results but with some di↵erent significance levels. See Table A.4 for
all significance levels and additional equality of mean prices.
Olive Oil For olive oil, the mean bid price for olive oil with at least 95% organic
ingredients is the highest. We reject the null hypothesis that the olive oil with at least 95%
organic ingredients is equal to the mean bids for conventional olive oil. However, we fail to reject
11
the null hypothesis that olive oil with at least 95% organic ingredients is equal to the mean
price of olive oil with at least 97% and at least 99% organic ingredients. We also fail to reject
the null hypothesis that the mean price of olive oil with at least 97% organic ingredients is equal
to the conventional mean prices, olive oil with at least 99% organic ingredients. Additionally,
we fail to reject the null hypothesis of olive oil with at least 99% organic ingredients is equal
to the conventional mean from all bids on olive oil.
When omitting zeros we reject the null hypothesis that the mean bid for olive oil with at
least 95% organic ingredients is equal to the mean bid of olive oil with at least 97% and at least
99% organic ingredients. We fail to reject the null hypothesis of equality for organic olive oil
with at least 97% organic ingredients with conventional means and at least 99%. See Table A.5
for additional information.
4.1.1.2 Treatment Two
In these data, no participants bid zero so we have one set of results. The tests performed
are that mean bid prices for two di↵erent purity levels of organic ingredients of a given food
type are equal using a t-test. For all three goods, co↵ee, maple syrup, and olive oil, mean bid
prices increase with the purity level. For example, with olive oil, the mean bid price for olive oil
with at least 95% organic ingredients is $5.83, for olive oil with at least 97% organic ingredients
is $6.03 and for olive oil with at least 99% organic ingredients is $6.33. To confirm that these
di↵erences are statistically significant, we conducted a series of null hypotheses that pairs of
mean bid prices are equal. In all cases, the null hypothesis was rejected at the 1% significance
level. See Table A.6 for more details.
4.2 Regression Analysis of Bid Prices
We develop a multiple regression model to test the hypothesis that economic and personal
attributes can explain some of the di↵erences in bid prices for organic and conventional products
of the same type across participants under the first treatment. We first propose a model to
explain the price of the organic or conventional version of a given food type and proceed to
12
transform the model into one explaining price di↵erences. Equation (4.1) is the model of the
bid price for a given food product.
Y gij =  
g
i0 +  
g
iXj +  
g
ioDo +  
g
i0P0 +  
g
i1P1 + µ
g
ij , (4.1)
where: g (goods) = c,s, and o (c = co↵ee, s = maple syrup and o = olive oil),
i = 1,2 (1 = plain label and 2 = organic of some % purity),
j=individual,
Y= WTP bid.
In equation (4.1),Xj is the vector of exogenous variables, i.e., economic and social attributes
of a participant; Dm is a dummy variable for m = s (maple syrup), o (olive oil); and Pn is a
dummy variable for n = 0 (  97 % organic ingredients), 1 (  99% organic ingredients). The
zero mean random disturbance term µgij represents the e↵ect of other (excluded) variables on
WTP and  gi0 is the intercept term.
Now consider the di↵erence in an individual’s WTP for an organic version of a food product
relative to a conventional version of the same product. Hence, we can take the di↵erence in
bid price equations for the organic and conventional version of (4.1) to obtain equation (4.2).
Y g2j   Y g1j =  0 +  Xj +  sDs +  oDo + ⇢0P0 + ⇢1P1 + ✏j , (4.2)
where Y g2j   Y g1j is the bid price di↵erence for the jth individual of good g,  0 (= g20    g10) is
the intercept term,   (= g2    g1) is the vector of estimated coe cients associated with Xj , the
vector of endogenous variables,  s (= 
g
2s    g1s) is the coe cient for the dummy variable Ds
for good syrup,  o (= 
g
2o    g1o) is the coe cient for the dummy variable Do for good oil, ⇢0
(= g20    g10) is the coe cient for the dummy variable P0 for at least 97% organic ingredients,
⇢1 (= 
g
21  g11) is the coe cient for the dummy variable P1 for at least 99% organic ingredients,
and ✏j (=µ
g
2j   µg1j) is a new zero mean random disturbance term. For each dummy variable,
a yes is designated as a 1 and any other response is designated as a 0. We then use co↵ee and
at least 95% organic purity as our respective reference commodity and purity level.
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We now define the di↵erence equation for each good, g = c, s, and o;
Y c2j   Y c1j =  0 +  Xj + ⇢0P0 + ⇢1P1 + ✏j , (4.3)
Y s2j   Y s1j =  00 +  Xj +  sDs + ⇢0P0 + ⇢1P1 + ✏0j , (4.4)
Y o2j   Y o1j =  000 +  Xj +  oDo + ⇢0P0 + ⇢1P1 + ✏00j . (4.5)
Dummy variables for goods are omitted in the previous equations for ease of notation when a
variable would have a value of zero. Equations (4.3), (4.4), and (4.5) can be stacked together
to make a regression model pooled over product types (co↵ee, maple syrup, and olive oil) using
370 observations.
4.2.1 Empirical Model
The exact empirical specification of the stacked version of equation (4.3), (4.4) and (4.5) is
as follows:
 Yj =  0 +  1age+  2age
2 +  3ed+  4undrg +  5incmpp+  6incmpp
2
+  7labmore+  8infmore+  9emag +  10envr +  11healthy
+  sDs +  oDo + ⇢0P0 + ⇢1P1 + ✏j .
(4.6)
This specification was chosen because it included most of the variables for which we had
information and for which we anticipated might explain bid price di↵erences. See Table A.7
for exact definitions of regressors.
We built the model thinking age2, ed, undrg, incmpp, labmore, infmore, envr, healthy, P0
and P1 will all have positively signed coe cients, and age, incmpp2, emag will have negatively
signed coe cients. We agree with some other studies which show education and income have
positive relationships with WTP for organic goods. Additionally, we think that people who
are more interested in food ingredients and organics have become more informed because of
their preferences for organics, suggesting a positive relationship for WTP. Similarly, many
health conscious consumers read food labels before purchasing a product, which we think will
be positively correlated with WTP. As we are unable to tell if a participant is employed in
organic agriculture or farming, and less than 1% of Iowa’s land acreage is organically certified,
14
we believe emag will have a negative sign (even as Iowa has the 5th most certified organic
operations in the United States as of 2008) (USDA: ERS, 2010). One of our study questions
is whether consumers are willing to pay more for higher levels of organic purity and we think
they will, implying P0 and P1 will have positively signed coe cients.
In Table A.8, the following variables had coe cients that were significantly di↵erent from
zero: education and being a member of an environmental group are significantly di↵erent from
zero at the 5% level. Additionally, being an undergraduate student, income per person, and
how well an individual was informed about organic foods have coe cients significantly di↵erent
from zero at the 10% level, but not at the 5% level. Next we performed a series of joint null
hypotheses that coe cients of two or more related variables had coe cients that were zero: (i)
age and age2 (ii) incmpp and incmpp2, (iii) Ds and Do, and (iv) P0 and P1. The results of
these tests are reported in Table A.9. In this equation, the R2 is 0.102. Based on the reported
t- and F-tests, roughly P-values larger than 10%, and a little experimentation, we performed a
test of the joint null hypothesis that the coe cients on the following variables were zero: age,
age2, labmore, emag, healthy, Ds, and Do. The sample value of the F statistic is 2.68 and the
tabled value of the F statistic with 8 and 362 degrees of freedom is 4.38. We fail to reject the
null hypothesis at the 5% level (Prob >F = 0.626).
Table A.10 reports the estimated coe cients of our refined model (where this last set of
variables has been excluded). We exclude these regressors as they are both individually and
jointly non-significant and do not focus directly on the question our study wished to address.
The results in this regression are quite interesting. Additional education of an individual
increases WTP for organic relative to a conventional version of a good. An individual being
an undergraduate student increases willingness to pay for organic relative to conventional for
a good. The more informed that an individual is about organics, and being a member of and
environmental group, the more they are willing to pay for organic relative to a conventional
good. Finally, other things equal, below $85,400 of household income per person, an increase
in income increases WTP for organic relative to conventional for a good. But above this
level, additional income per capita reduces WTP. This non-linear marginal e↵ect is graphed
in Figure B.1. See the Appendix C for derivation and additional information. The dummy
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variable for at least 97% organic purity is negative and the dummy variable for at least 99%
purity is positive. However, these coe cients are not significant. Finally, in this refined model,
the R2 is 0.088.
4.2.2 Equality of Means of Di↵erences
We run single variable F-tests to determine if there is a significant di↵erence in the di↵erence
in WTP for the products, i.e., testing if at least 95% organic co↵ee less conventional co↵ee is
equal to at least 97% organic co↵ee less conventional co↵ee. We fail to reject the null hypothesis
of equality in all cases other than with at least 95% and at least 99% organic maple syrup (at
least 95% organic syrup less conventional syrup is equal to at least 99% organic syrup less
conventional syrup; Prob >F = 0.037).
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CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Our choice of products in the auctions was significantly limited due to availability of prod-
ucts as 100% organic and conventional. Questions during the experiment often resulted in
inquiries as to what some of the products were. For example, participants frequently did not
know what maple syrup was (often international participants had never seen or used it before).
We suggested maple syrup was a natural sweetening product from maple tree sap similar to
honey but with a much lower relative viscosity and stronger taste. Another problem is that
co↵ee seems to be polarizing; it is either loved or hated. We think this accounts for the higher
number of zero bids.
From Table A.1 we can see that many of the characteristics of the participants have high
variance relative to the means. This is not a problem itself but these means and variances
might not be representative of the general consumer. Income per person really stands out with
a mean of approximately $30,500 and a standard deviation of $23,500. We attempted to gather
a representative sample of the population for our study but ideally we would have run the
experiment in multiple locations within the Midwest with more participants.
Our data suggests that consumers are generally willing to pay more for organic food products
relative to conventional (see Table A.11 for maximum and minimum bid amounts). Interest-
ingly, participants in Treatment One bid zero for most of the products (all but two) whereas in
Treatment Two no zero bids were recorded. Participants, however, were not necessarily willing
to pay more for higher purity of organic food products already at a relatively high level of
organic purity (at least 95%). Additional education, being an undergraduate student, being
more informed about organics, being a member of an environmental group, and individual in-
come up to $85,400 all contribute positively to WTP for organic goods relative to conventional
goods.
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APPENDIX A. TABLES
Table A.1 Characteristics of Participants (N=154)
Variable Definition Mean S.D.
Age Participant’s age in years 37.06 15.48
Gender 1 if participant is male 0.44 0.50
Married 1 if participant is married 0.41 0.49
White 1 if participant is white 0.72 0.44
Agriculture 1 if employed in agriculture or farming 0.08 0.27
Undergraduate 1 if participant is an undergraduate student 0.10 0.30
Household Number of individuals in participant’s household 2.39 1.17
Education Years of schooling completed 17.02 2.69
Income per person Household income per person in $1,000s 30.55 23.54
Table A.2 Treatment One Bids
 95%  97%  99%
Co↵ee bids 40 39 50
– Number of bids omitted 5 1 5
Maple Syrup bids 50 40 39
– Number of bids omitted 2 2 0
Olive Oil bids 39 50 40
– Number of bids omitted 0 1 1
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Table A.3 Equality of Means for Conventional and Organic Co↵ee (Treatment One)
Co↵ee*
Conventional (name) Organic (name)
Mean WTP (from con. vs   95% bids) 1.609 (con95 mean) 2.134 (95 mean)
Mean WTP (from con. vs   97% bids) 1.859 (con97 mean) 2.481 (97 mean)
Mean WTP (from con. vs   99% bids) 1.458 (con99 mean) 1.916 (99 mean)
Mean WTP from all bids (con. from all) 1.626 (con all mean)
t–test for mean of 95% (95 mean = “”) Hypothesis Test** Significance Level
con all mean Ha > 0.025
con95 mean Ha > 0.022
97 mean Ha < 0.094
99 mean Fail to reject null
t–test for mean of 97% (97 mean = “”) Hypothesis Test Significance Level
con all Ha > 0.001
con97 Ha > 0.007
99 mean Ha > 0.013
t–test for mean of 99% (99 mean = “”) Hypothesis Test Significance Level
con all Ha > 0.076
con99 Ha > 0.013
Co↵ee - Omitting Zeros
Conventional (name) Organic (name)
Mean WTP (from con. vs   95% bids) 1.950 (con95 mean) 2.445 (95 mean)
Mean WTP (from con. vs   97% bids) 1.908 (con97 mean) 2.546 (97 mean)
Mean WTP (from con. vs   99% bids) 1.778 (con99 mean) 2.129 (99 mean)
Mean WTP from all bids (con. from all) 1.873 (con all mean)
t–test for mean of 95% (95 mean = “”) Hypothesis Test Significance Level
con all mean Fail to reject null
con95 mean Fail to reject null
97 mean Ha < 0.059
99 mean Fail to reject null
t–test for mean of 97% (97 mean = “”) Hypothesis Test Significance Level
con all Ha > 0.008
con97 Ha > 0.012
99 mean Ha > 0.078
t–test for mean of 99% (99 mean = “”) Hypothesis Test Significance Level
con all Fail to reject null
con99 Fail to reject null
* All means in USD (Tables A.3, A.4, A.5, and A.6)
** Interpretation of “Hypothesis Test” - if reject null, hypothesis alternative (Ha) signed
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Table A.4 Equality of Means for Conventional and Organic Maple Syrup (Treatment One)
Maple Syrup
Conventional (name) Organic (name)
Mean WTP (from con. vs   95% bids) 2.347 (con95 mean) 2.738 (95 mean)
Mean WTP (from con. vs   97% bids) 2.949 (con97 mean) 2.937 (97 mean)
Mean WTP (from con. vs   99% bids) 2.234 (con99 mean) 4.068 (99 mean)
Mean WTP from all bids (con. from all) 2.485 (con all mean)
t–test for mean of 95% (95 mean = “”) Hypothesis Test Significance Level
con all mean Fail to reject null
con95 mean Fail to reject null
97 mean Fail to reject null
99 mean Ha < 0.001
t–test for mean of 97% (97 mean = “”) Hypothesis Test Significance Level
con all Fail to reject null
con97 Fail to reject null
99 mean Ha < 0.004
t–test for mean of 99% (99 mean = “”) Hypothesis Test Significance Level
con all Ha > 0.000
con99 Ha > 0.000
Maple Syrup - Omitting Zeros
Conventional (name) Organic (name)
Mean WTP (from con. vs   95% bids) 2.470 (con95 mean) 2.852 (95 mean)
Mean WTP (from con. vs   97% bids) 2.949 (con97 mean) 3.092 (97 mean)
Mean WTP (from con. vs   99% bids) 2.377 (con99 mean) 4.068 (99 mean)
Mean WTP from all bids (con. from all) 2.585 (con all mean)
t–test for mean of 95% (95 mean = “”) Hypothesis Test Significance Level
con all mean Fail to reject null
con95 mean Fail to reject null
97 mean Fail to reject null
99 mean Ha < 0.000
t–test for mean of 97% (97 mean = “”) Hypothesis Test Significance Level
con all Fail to reject null
con97 Fail to reject null
99 mean Ha < 0.004
t–test for mean of 99% (99 mean = “”) Hypothesis Test Significance Level
con all Ha > 0.000
con99 Ha > 0.000
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Table A.5 Equality of Means for Conventional and Organic Olive Oil (Treatment One)
Olive Oil
Conventional (name) Organic (name)
Mean WTP (from con. vs   95% bids) 2.125 (con95 mean) 3.303 (95 mean)
Mean WTP (from con. vs   97% bids) 2.525 (con97 mean) 2.531 (97 mean)
Mean WTP (from con. vs   99% bids) 2.159 (con99 mean) 2.560(99 mean)
Mean WTP from all bids (con. from all) 2.259 (con all mean)
t–test for mean of 95% (95 mean = “”) Hypothesis Test Significance Level
con all mean Ha > 0.001
con95 mean Ha > 0.001
97 mean Ha > 0.012
99 mean Ha > 0.015
t–test for mean of 97% (97 mean = “”) Hypothesis Test Significance Level
con all Fail to reject null
con97 Fail to reject null
99 mean Fail to reject null
t–test for mean of 99% (99 mean = “”) Hypothesis Test Significance Level
con all Fail to reject null
con99 Ha > 0.060
Olive Oil - Omitting Zeros
Conventional (name) Organic (name)
Mean WTP (from con. vs   95% bids) 2.125 (con95 mean) 3.303 (95 mean)
Mean WTP (from con. vs   97% bids) 2.525 (con97 mean) 2.582 (97 mean)
Mean WTP (from con. vs   99% bids) 2.249 (con99 mean) 2.624(99 mean)
Mean WTP from all bids (con. from all) 2.295 (con all mean)
t–test for mean of 95% (95 mean = “”) Hypothesis Test Significance Level
con all mean Ha > 0.002
con95 mean Ha > 0.001
97 mean Ha > 0.017
99 mean Ha > 0.023
t–test for mean of 97% (97 mean = “”) Hypothesis Test Significance Level
con all Fail to reject null
con97 Fail to reject null
99 mean Fail to reject null
t–test for mean of 99% (99 mean = “”) Hypothesis Test Significance Level
con all Fail to reject null
con99 Fail to reject null
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Table A.6 Equality of Means Across Purity Levels (Treatment Two)
Co↵ee
  95% (name)   97% (name)   99% (name)
Means 5.537 (95 mean) 5.725 (97 mean) 5.94 (99 mean)
t–tests Hypothesis Test Significance Level
95 mean = 97 mean Ha < 0.001
95 mean = 99 mean Ha < 0.001
97 mean = 99 mean Ha < 0.001
Maple Syrup
  95% (name)   97% (name)   99% (name)
Means 6.567 (95 mean) 6.884 (97 mean) 7.365 (99 mean)
t–tests Hypothesis Test Significance Level
95 mean = 97 mean Ha < 0.008
95 mean = 99 mean Ha < 0.002
97 mean = 99 mean Ha < 0.002
Olive Oil
  95% (name)   97% (name)   99% (name)
Means 5.831 (95 mean) 6.029 (97 mean) 6.327 (99 mean)
t–tests Hypothesis Test Significance Level
95 mean = 97 mean Ha < 0.003
95 mean = 99 mean Ha < 0.004
97 mean = 99 mean Ha < 0.009
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Table A.8 OLS General Model of Price Di↵erences: Organic less Conventional
Regressors Coe cients Standard Errors
Intercept -1.149 0.771
Age -0.011 0.035
Age x age -0.0001 0.0004
Education 0.067** 0.028
Undergraduate (=1) 0.410* 0.219
Income per person 0.015* 0.010
Income per person x income per person -0.0001 0.0001
Read label more (=1) -0.032 0.119
Relatively more informed about organics (=1) 0.223* 0.119
Employed in agriculture or farming (=1) -0.222 0.216
Member of environmental group (=1) 0.414** 0.165
Physically healthy participant (=1) -0.171 0.218
Maple syrup (=1) 0.165 0.124
Olive oil (=1) -0.047 0.123
At least 97% organic (=1) -0.079 0.122
At least 99% organic (=1) 0.060 0.123
R2 0.102
⇤ Statistical significance at the 10% level
⇤⇤ Statistical significance at the 5% level
Table A.9 OLS General Model Joint Tests
Regressors/Hypothesis Test Probability >F (or P values)
age = 0 0.934
age2 = 0
incmpp = 0 0.030
incmpp2 = 0
Do = 0 0.188
Ds = 0
P0 = 0 0.518
P1 = 0
age = 0 0.626
age2 = 0
emag = 0
healthy = 0
labmore = 0
Do = 0
Ds = 0
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Table A.10 OLS Refined Model of Price Di↵erences: Organic less Conventional
Regressors Coe cients Standard Errors
Intercept -0.979**˜ 0.503
Education 0.066** 0.027
Undergraduate (=1) 0.357** 0.180
Income per person 0.012*˜ 0.008
Income per person x income per person -0.0001 0.0001
Relatively more informed about organics (=1) 0.179*˜ 0.110
Member of environmental group (=1) 0.392** 0.163
At least 97% organic (=1) -0.098 0.122
At least 99% organic (=1) 0.043 0.123
R2 0.088
⇤Statistical significance at the 10% level
⇤⇤ Statistical significance at the 5% level
˜marginal significance (within 1% of being significant)
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Table A.11 Bid Ranges in USD
Treatment One Bids
Co↵ee Max Min
Conventional 4.50 0.00
  95% Organic 6.50 0.00
  97% Organic 7.00 0.00
  99% Organic 5.00 0.00
Maple Syrup Max Min
Conventional 4.50 0.00
  95% Organic 9.95 0.00
  97% Organic 12.00 0.00
  99% Organic 11.11 0.25
Olive Oil Max Min
Conventional 10.00 0.00
  95% Organic 9.00 0.25
  97% Organic 10.00 0.00
  99% Organic 6.50 0.00
Treatment Two Bids
Co↵ee Max Min
  95% Organic 4.30 0.13
  97% Organic 4.50 0.13
  99% Organic 5.00 0.13
Maple Syrup Max Min
  95% Organic 8.0 0.30
  97% Organic 8.00 0.40
  99% Organic 10.00 0.50
Olive Oil Max Min
  95% Organic 4.40 0.50
  97% Organic 4.60 0.50
  99% Organic 5.00 0.50
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APPENDIX B. FIGURES
Figure B.1 Di↵erence in WTP as a Function of Income Per Person
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APPENDIX C. ADDITIONAL MATERIAL
Nonlinear marginal e↵ects of income per capita
With age and income per person we look at the two following equations to find the minimum
and maximum amounts respectively:
Y = ↵0 + ↵1incmpp+ ↵2incmpp
2, (C.1)
Taking the derivative of (C.1) with respect to income per person, setting the equation equal
to zero, and substituting in the estimated coe cients we get the following:
dY
dincmpp
= ↵1 + 2↵2 ˆincmpp = 0, (C.2)
ˆincmpp =
 ↵1
2↵2
=
 0.012
2 ⇤ ( 0.0001) = 85.378.
1 (C.3)
From equation (C.1) and results from Table A.10 we plot the e↵ect of per capita household
income on the di↵erenced WTP (Figure B.1).
1Coe cients used in actual estimation have greater precision than shown.
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